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1 Introduction
Public institutions and companies typically employ physical credentials (such as passports, social security cards, and
employee badges) to identify individuals. Individuals can
choose where to store their physical credentials, and
sometimes, they can decide to whom their credentials are
disclosed. These familiar privileges inspired a new type of
digital credential called a verifiable credential (VC). Similar to physical credentials, individuals can store their
verifiable credentials in a so-called digital wallet on their
mobile phone, on another edge device, or in the cloud, and
they can use verifiable credentials for identification,
authentication, and authorization (Sporny et al. 2019).
Verifiable credentials and digital wallets offer a convenient, secure, and privacy-oriented alternative to current
physical and digital identity management systems. A recent
example – COVID-19 vaccination certificates – highlights
this. The verification of paper-based vaccination
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certificates is often error-prone and time-consuming,
especially when many certificates have to be verified in a
short period of time, e.g., at a football match or when
boarding a plane. Moreover, to establish a sufficient level
of authenticity, paper-based vaccination certificates are
typically disclosed with additional personal information
and identity documents, such as a physical ID card. This
requirement to disclose a considerable amount of personal
information raises privacy concerns, it is inconvenient, and
it increases the total verification time.
The storage of vaccination-related digital information in
a centralized database enables faster and more convenient
verification, yet it also raises ethical, security, and privacy
concerns. Such databases can facilitate unintended profiling, they are appealing targets for hackers, and they typically limit individuals’ control over the processing of their
personal data (Rieger et al. 2021). The European Union
thus permits Member States’ governments to directly issue
EU Digital COVID Certificates to wallets that are controlled by citizens (European Commission 2021b).
Although this development is notable, EU Digital COVID
Certificates cannot yet be stored in a standardized wallet alongside a broad array of documents, certificates, and
credentials that can be used to prove a subject’s identity
(Rieger et al. 2021). Further work remains to be done.
This is precisely what motivates the development of
verifiable credentials and standardized digital wallets. In
this catchword, we introduce this decentralized, interoperable approach to digital identity management. In particular,
we discuss the challenges of today’s centralized identity
management and investigate current developments
regarding verifiable credentials and digital wallets. Finally,
we offer suggestions about promising areas of research into
decentralized digital identities.
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2 Review of the Status Quo
2.1 Basic Terms
To create a common basis for discussion, it is important to
first define the terms digital identity and subject. A digital
identity is often defined as a digital reference to a person
(Alamillo-Domingo 2020). It is thus something that a
subject has and uses in response to requests for digital
identification, authentication, or proofs of authorization. A
digital identity consists of attributes that can be revoked,
deleted, transferred, or exchanged, such as citizenship,
institutional affiliations, and proofs of ownership (Lyons
et al. 2019; Preukschat and Reed 2021). Identity attributes
are typically connected to a subject via a unique identifier
within a system or domain, such as an index in a database
or a social security number (Bosworth et al. 2005).
The subject of a digital identity is often a human, but the
subject can also be a legal entity, an animal, or a device,
among other things. Hence discussions of digital identities
should not place an exclusive emphasis on human subjects
(Dietz and Pernul 2020; Fedrecheski et al. 2020; Zwitter
et al. 2020). Subjects can prove their identity attributes
using credentials (Clauß and Köhntopp 2001). A credential
can be a password that demonstrates ownership of a particular identifier like an email address, or else a credential
can be a verifiable document issued by a third party that
specifies identity attributes like a government-issued ID
card (Bosworth et al. 2005).
2.2 Identity Data Stored in Centralized Silos
In today’s web, digital identities are predominantly managed via service-specific user accounts that involve username-password combinations. Everyday complaints
concerning the relationship between users and passwordbased authentication methods are numerous. Users struggle, for example, to manage the growing number of passwords (Novakouski 2013), and they can fall victim to
password theft schemes such as phishing, key-logging,
viruses, and malware (Herley 2009). Furthermore, users
cannot seamlessly transfer identity-related information
from one of their accounts to another. Users are thus
required to repeat tedious registration processes, in which
they disclose ID cards, a driver’s license, bank account
information, and more. Federated identity management
aims to mitigate some of these issues via Single Sign-On
platforms that transfer identity-related information between
services that are connected to the platform (Maler and Reed
2008).
Corporate digital identity platforms are consequently
built upon large centralized silos that store identity data.
These silos are a predominant cause of concerns due to
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security weaknesses, dubious data-sharing and surveillance
ethics, and compromised privacy rights (Chaum 1985;
Nofer et al. 2017; van der Aalst et al. 2019; Zuboff 2019;
Nayar 2012). In August 2013, a successful hack compromised every one of Yahoo’s three billion user accounts
(Oath 2017). Hacks of this nature are not just embarrassing;
they are also costly (Cowley 2019; Preukschat and Reed
2021). In June 2014, Aleksandr Kogan, a researcher from
Cambridge University’s Psychometrics Centre developed a
personality quiz app for Facebook. Approximately 270,000
Facebook users installed the app and – unwittingly, in most
cases – granted the app access to their identity data as well
as their friends’ identity data. The app generated a private
database that contained information about 50 million
Facebook users. Aleksandr Kogan sold the database to a
firm named Cambridge Analytica, who then used the
database to construct 30 million psychological profiles
about voters (Meyer 2018). Since the incident did not
involve a hack, it is primarily an ethical problem (Aiello
2018). On 20 March 2018 the United States’ Federal Trade
Commission opened an investigation to see if Facebook
violated a data-sharing consent decree from 2012
(McKinnon 2018).
Government-managed digital identity platforms are
affected by many of the same ethical and security problems
as corporate digital identity platforms (Khera 2018; Ganesh
2018; Nayar 2012; Pahwa 2017). India’s national government, for example, created a digital identity platform
named Aadhaar, which uses biometric data to reduce fraud
and leakage. If biometric data is stolen or compromised, it
is difficult to reverse the damage (Pandya 2019). One
cannot ask a third party to reset one’s fingerprints, for
instance, the way that one can request a password reset.
Aadhaar’s centralized trust model notably failed to prevent
an Aadhaar enrolment center’s supervisor from issuing an
illegal ID for his dog (Jain 2015; Ganesh 2018). Problems
also arise when Aadhaar shares citizens’ data with various
service providers. In 2017, for example, the Kerala State
government’s pension department copied information from
the Aadhaar database and shared 3.5 million citizens’ data
without the citizens’ consent. The citizens’ names,
addresses, telephone numbers, bank account details, Aadhaar identifier-numbers, and photographs were published to
the pension service’s website, which is visible to all
(Tarafdar and Bose 2019). A year later, a security expert
discovered a similar flaw: a State-owned service provider
named Indane copied Aadhaar data and allowed potentially
anyone to access information about citizens’ names, Aadhaar identifier-numbers, and bank account details
(Christopher 2018; Graglia et al. 2018).
Government-managed digital identity systems nonetheless offer some notable benefits in comparison with physical identity management systems (World Bank 2015;
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Clark et al. 2019). Estonia’s and Slovenia’s national governments, for example, used digitization to reduce ID-related administration costs. Estonia’s national electronic
identification document (eID) and X-Road data exchange
layer saves an estimated two percent of Gross Domestic
Product per year by reducing paper-based, ID-related
transaction costs. Slovenia’s Ministry of Social Affairs
generates savings via a digital platform that can verify
identity information across more than 50 databases.
Despite its flaws, the Aadhaar system eliminates many fake
and duplicate beneficiaries of government programs, which
results in significant savings (World Bank 2018b). Private
companies in India also benefit from the Aadhaar system.
Aadhaar reduced an Indian firm’s typical customer onboarding cost from 1500 rupees to 10 rupees (World Bank
2018a).

3 Decentralized Digital Identities
3.1 Proposals for Change
Concerns about centralized digital identity platforms –
managed either by companies or governments – are not
new. In 2005, Microsoft’s Chief Identity Architect, Kim
Cameron fretted, ‘‘If we do nothing, we will face rapidly
proliferating episodes of theft and deception that will
cumulatively erode public trust in the Internet’’.
Researchers began to focus on attribute-based access control systems that enable the authentication of natural persons based on a public key infrastructure (PKI) (Backes
et al. 2005; Lioy et al. 2006). In spite of their technical
advantages, these solutions failed to achieve mainstream
adoption (Kubach et al. 2020; Novakouski 2013).
In 2013, Timothy Ruff and Jason Law founded Evernym
in response to this ‘‘growing digital identity crisis’’ (Andrade-Walz 2019). Evernym’s staff later created the
international, non-profit Sovrin Foundation and donated
code to Linux’s Hyperledger Aries and Indy projects. Over
the last few years, many similar projects have emerged in
Table 1 Various centralized
problems and proposed,
decentralized solutions
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response to concerns about centralized platforms. Table 1
summarizes the broad array of identified problems and
proposed, decentralized solutions.
Decentralized digital identity projects typically employ
verifiable credentials and digital wallets. Their popularization can be traced to a 2017 proposal by Andrew Tobin
and Drummond Reed from Evernym and Sovrin. According to the proposal, users of verifiable credentials and
digital wallets do not have to purchase and carry specialized security hardware such as NFC smart-cards, encrypted
USB wallets, or a Google Titan Security Key. Tobin and
Reed’s proposal also does away with the need for identity
data silos and password-based authentication, and it
increases subjects’ control over the disclosure and
exchange of their data. The scope of Tobin and Reed’s
proposal is intentionally broader than the FIDO2 Project
that focuses on password-free authentication; and since
interoperability is crucial to Tobin and Reed’s proposal, it
is also distinct from domain-specific login apps (Ehrlich
et al. 2021; Tobin and Reed 2017).
In 2019, the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
issued a formal Recommendation of verifiable credentials.
The W3C defined verifiable credentials as digital documents issued with digital signatures. Asymmetric (public/
private key) cryptography protects the digital signatures
from corruption. For enhanced privacy, zero-knowledge
proofs can additionally be used to reveal only the minimum
of information required in an interaction. This feature is
called selective disclosure or minimal disclosure (Sporny
et al. 2019). Some information required by verifiable credentials is meant to be public, such as credential schemas
or the revocation status of particular credentials (Tobin
2018). This public information can be stored on a blockchain like Hyperledger Indy or by a X.509 certificate
authority (Chadwick 2020).
The storage of verifiable credentials in digital wallets is
fundamentally different from the storage of individuals’
identity information in large, government-managed databases (like India’s Aadhaar) or in monetized data silos
owned by Big Tech companies (like Alphabet, Amazon,

Problem diagnoses

Proposed solutions

Big Tech and government surveillance

Non-correlatable identifiers

‘‘Big’’, identity data silos

‘‘Little’’, distributed identity wallets

Digital identity theft and credential fraud

Machine-readable verifiable credentials

Hacked certificate authorities (centralized PKI)

DLT and KERI (decentralized PKI)

ID vendor lock-in and ‘‘walled gardens’’

Open, interoperable, digital ID standards

Complicated password management

Password-free, PKI-based authentication

Specialized hardware for PKI-based authentication

User-friendly wallet apps on common devices

‘‘Data creep’’ and excessive demands for attributes

Selective disclosure and consent management

Constant reliance on online identity providers

Offline, bi-lateral communication
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Apple, Facebook, and Microsoft). Many decentralized
identity projects also make use of decentralized identifiers
(DIDs). DIDs are references to information about a subject’s public keys and associated metadata. DIDs enable
end-to-end encrypted communication without the need for
a third party. DIDs can be permanent and public, which is
useful for public institutions. Alternatively, they can be
temporary and private, which helps individuals resist third
parties’ attempts to track their online interactions and
correlate their identity information (Reed et al. 2021).
Cryptographic key pairs are also stored in digital wallets, together with verifiable credentials. Information
derived from verifiable credentials can be released from a
digital wallet in response to requests from various service
providers, even if an Internet connection is not available
(e.g., via Bluetooth or NFC). This requires secure and
standardized, bi-lateral communication. The W3C is currently developing a new protocol, named DIDComm, for
this purpose (Reed et al. 2021).
3.2 Signs of Momentum and Political Tensions
Support for verifiable credentials and digital wallets is
growing, especially in Europe and North America. There
are a few notable examples. Canadian public authorities
created the Verifiable Organizations Network (VON); the
European Union established the European Self-Sovereign
Identity Framework (ESSIF), which utilizes the European
Blockchain Service Infrastructure (EBSI); Germany’s
Federal Chancellery initiated a decentralized digital identity project; and the Linux Foundation established the Trust
over IP Stacks.
Canada’s Verifiable Organizations Network uses verifiable credentials to issue digital licenses, permits, and registrations to legal entities (Bouma and Robert 2021). The
network’s credentials can be stored in wallets that are
compatible with Hyperledger Aries. The network is currently supported by the provincial governments of British
Columbia and Ontario as well as the federal government of
Canada (Jordan 2018). The European Blockchain Services
Infrastructure uses verifiable credentials to issue official
documents from public institutions, such as digital diplomas and social security passes (European Commission
2020). Germany’s Federal Chancellery initiated a decentralized digital identity project in 2021 that is based on
verifiable credentials and Aries-compatible wallets. The
Chancellery’s project uses verifiable credentials to issue a
digital version of Germany’s physical eID card plus company travel documents, so that hotels in Germany can
implement fast and secure, digital check-in processes
without requiring a hardware eID card reader (Federal
German Government 2021).
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The Trust over IP Foundation seeks to align various
decentralized digital identity projects. It issues global
compatibility guidelines for Hyperledger Aries and Indy,
verifiable credentials, and closely related technologies.
Trust over IP was established in May 2020 by the Linux
Foundation, following initial efforts from the provincial
government of British Columbia, esatus, Evernym, IBM,
Kiva, and Mastercard (Dizme et al. 2020). Trust over IP
aims to compose ‘‘the digital trust layer that was missing in
the original design of the Internet’’ – trust that is required
for global, digital identification (Linux Foundation 2020).
As a counterpoint to the support for verifiable credentials and digital wallets, there is resistance from incumbents. A notable case is the W3C Verifiable Claims Task
Force, which began work in November 2015. The following year, the Task Force proposed the formation of a
W3C Verifiable Claims Working Group, which is able to
issue an official Recommendation. (A Task Force is not.)
Approval for the formation of a Working Group requires a
vote of the W3C’s full membership. Many W3C members
voted against the Verifiable Claims Working Group, so the
proposal almost failed (Reed 2018). A public email, written
by Michael Champion from Microsoft, highlighted the
political nature of the dispute. Champion asserted that the
W3C’s role is to observe industry developments, not to
lead. According to him, the proposed Verifiable Claims
Working Group could not ‘‘decree a solution that will
succeed by force of W3C’s authority’’. Champion
acknowledged the similar arguments raised in public by
Chris Wilson from Google and Tantek Çelik from the
Mozilla Corporation (Champion 2016).
Mozilla reiterated its opposition in August 2020 when it
argued that California’s Assembly Bill Number 2004,
‘‘Medical test results: verification credentials’’, should be
rejected, for it ‘‘dictates one particular technical approach’’
– the use of W3C verifiable credentials to communicate
COVID-19 test results (Riley 2020). The Electronic Frontier Foundation and the American Civil Liberties Union
also issued criticism of the bill. California’s Governor,
Gavin Newsom, vetoed the bill on 25 September 2020. As
for Microsoft, they later contributed to industry developments and launched version 1.0 of their Identity Overlay
Network (ION) in March 2021. ION uses verifiable credentials and a blockchain-agnostic ‘‘sidetree’’ protocol as a
PKI.
3.3 Self-Sovereign Identity

Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) is a contested name that is
often used to promote various decentralized digital identity
projects (Preukschat and Reed 2021; Chadwick 2020;
Cheesman 2020; Halpin 2020; Kubach et al. 2020). The
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Sovrin Foundation recently defined SSI as a set of community-sourced ethical principles that pertain to digital
identities, privacy rights, and personal information (Sovrin
Foundation 2020). SSI’s ethical principles typically assert
that individuals should not cede a disproportionate amount
of control to centralized digital identity providers like Big
Tech companies or governments (Allen 2016; Spiekermann
and Korunovska 2017).
Companies like esatus, Evernym, and Trinsic use the
name SSI to market decentralized digital identity solutions
that involve verifiable credentials, Aries-compatible wallets, and a blockchain-based PKI; but other companies use
the same name to market solutions that do not necessarily
involve any of these things (Gasteiger 2021; Kubach et al.
2020; Kuperberg 2020). Table 2 briefly illustrates SSI’s
ambiguity and lack of commonality.
The European Blockchain Partnership, the European
IDunion consortium, the Spanish Alastria Network, and
Germany’s Federal Chancellery use the name SSI to promote citizens’ control over their identity data. Informal,
web-based commentaries likewise associate SSI with
individuals’ data property rights and privacy ethics (Reed
and Sabadello 2019; Windley 2020; Preukschat and Reed
2021; Sabadello 2021). It is worth noting that, within formal contexts, sovereignty is typically discussed in relation
to governance and State powers, not individuals’ identities
or individuals’ property rights (Reijers et al. 2018; Foucault 1978).
SSI is sometimes associated with controversial politics
and hyperbole (Graglia et al. 2018; Preukschat and Reed
2021; Windley 2020; Bouma and Robert 2021; Fry and
Renieris 2020; Speelman 2020; Ishmaev 2020; Schneider
2019; Giannopoulou and Wang 2021; Cheesman 2020). In
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the United States, for instance, the political concept of selfsovereignty is embraced by ‘‘sovereign citizens’’ – individuals that refuse to acknowledge any government
authority whatsoever (MacNab 2012; Ruff 2018; Haas
2016). Hence the following statement issued by Kim
Cameron from Microsoft: ‘‘Self-Sovereign Identity makes
me think of hillbillies on a survivalist kick’’ (Cameron
2018). The online Sovereign Individual movement also has
an affinity with SSI. The movement significantly contributes to demand for decentralized digital identity solutions (Preukschat and Reed 2021). To understand what
motivates the Sovereign Individual movement, Alex Preukschat and Drummond Reed from Evernym recommended a book called The Sovereign Individual: How to
Survive and Thrive During the Collapse of the Welfare
State. Preukschat and Reed (2021) describe the book’s
authors as ‘‘prescient about the [online] decentralization
movement’’, even though the type of decentralization
promoted by The Sovereign Individual is avowedly antidemocratic and ‘‘apocalyptic’’ (Davidson and Rees-Mogg
1997; O’Connell 2018). It is yet to be determined if SSI’s
association with controversial politics and hyperbole will
affect its adoption (Welling 2018; Bouma and Doerk
2020).

4 Research Opportunities
Decentralized digital identity – based on verifiable credentials and standardized digital wallets – is a rapidly
evolving topic. Its implications are especially relevant to
incumbent services that rely on the collection of personal
information and usage data. Decentralized digital identity

Table 2 ‘‘SSI’’ is one name given to very different projects
Projects labelled
‘‘SSI’’

Cryptoassets

Use of
VCs

Aries-compatible
wallet

Issuance feetokens

Use of
blockchain

On-chain identifiers
required

Use of
ZKPs

Aries/Indy affiliates

No

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

No

Yes

ESSIF, ID_Alastria

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Everest

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Microsoft’s ION

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

InfoCert’s Dizme

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

MATTR

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

Yes

Ontology

Yes

Yes

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Procivis’s eID?

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Serto (ex-uPort)

Yes

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No

Spruce’s Credible

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

No

No

Verifiable
Credentials Ltd.

No

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

Workday

No

Yes

No

No

Yes

Yes

No
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presents multiple opportunities for information systems
research. Table 3 lists potential avenues and exemplary
research questions.
A first avenue for research is the assessment of worthwhile applications for verifiable credentials and digital
wallets. In general, verifiable credentials and digital wallets
are appropriate if: (a) the fast, machine-verifiable exchange
of identity-related information is desired without the direct
interaction of issuers and verifiers, (b) centralized identity
management systems present privacy and security concerns, and (c) centralized identity management systems fail
to achieve adoption among a diverse array of stakeholders
due to a lack of trust or a fear of concentrated market
power. The latter topic is strikingly similar to established
research about the adoption of blockchain technology
(Pedersen et al. 2019). The application of digital identities
should be considered beyond natural persons to also
include organizations and smart devices (Fedrecheski et al.
2020).
Since decentralized digital identity management has the
potential to affect business models that collect identity
information and usage data, research can assess and
investigate the consequences. How will companies that
collect usage data adjust to the prospective adoption of

decentralized digital identities? Can regulation prevent
service providers from requesting more information from
users than they require? How will decentralized digital
identities affect data-driven platform strategies (De Reuver
et al. 2018) and personalized advertisements (De Keyzer
et al. 2015)?
Innovation in digital identity management is also
important to consider when designing and managing
business processes (Klarl et al. 2009; Mendling et al.
2020). Verifiable credentials and digital wallets can
potentially disrupt e-commerce registration and on-boarding processes. An order on an e-commerce website could
be completed, for example, by a user who has not previously registered with the website but who does have a
digital wallet. The user could scan a single QR code to
confirm the disclosure of identity information stored in
verifiable credentials, such as their address, their age, or
their credit card details. The European IDunion consortium
explores these opportunities, with the aim to reduce customer lock-in effects that benefit large platforms like
Amazon, Uber, and Airbnb.
A third promising avenue for research is the nexus of
verifiable credentials, digital wallets, and blockchain
technology. As noted, many decentralized digital identity

Table 3 A suggested research agenda for decentralized digital identities
Research avenue
Applications of decentralized digital identities

Exemplary research questions
When are decentralized digital identity systems justified?
How can worthwhile applications for decentralized digital identities be classified?

Implications of decentralized digital identities

How will decentralized digital identities affect strategies and business models that are
driven by user profiles?

Decentralized digital identities and blockchain

How does the use of blockchain affect decentralized digital identity projects?

How will decentralized digital identities affect the management of business processes?
How do decentralized digital identity projects influence the development of blockchain
technologies?
Regulation of decentralized digital identities

How can decentralized digital identity systems balance privacy and transparency
requirements?
How will decentralized digital identities affect eGovernment services?

Governance of decentralized digital identity systems

How does the governance of decentralized digital identity systems differ from centralized
systems?
How can governance become aligned across different decentralized digital identity
systems?
How can governance frameworks accommodate machine-to-machine interactions?

Design choices for decentralized digital identity
systems

How do different design choices affect the capabilities of decentralized digital identity
systems?
How do competing design choices affect the adoption of decentralized digital identities?

Socio-technical theories and decentralized digital
identities

How does the association with SSI principles affect decentralized digital identity
projects?
How do legal frameworks and cultural values affect the adoption of decentralized digital
identity systems?
How do decentralized digital identities affect organizational practices?
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projects use Hyperledger Indy or Ethereum-based blockchains like Hyperledger Besu to register information that
needs to be publicly available. While a close association
with blockchain may have helped the incubation of
decentralized digital identity projects (Mühle et al. 2018),
the long-term effects of this association are less clear.
Hence we believe there are opportunities for research
regarding the relationship between decentralized digital
identity
projects
and
blockchain
development
communities.
If blockchain is used with care and diligence, decentralized digital identity systems can ensure a high level of
privacy. This is especially true if sensitive personal data is
exchanged bi-laterally and selectively. A high level of
privacy, however, introduces its own set of challenges,
especially if privacy complicates the work of law
enforcement authorities (Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees 2021). Decentralized digital identity systems
must therefore balance privacy and transparency requirements, which creates further opportunities for research,
especially in the area of eGovernment services (Fridgen
et al. 2018). Decentralized digital identity systems might
allow citizens to better control the collection and exchange
of their personal data by public authorities; but since public
authorities in Europe and North America are typically
bound by strict laws that regulate their data-processing
activities, adding citizen consent as a mandatory second
lawful basis may complicate cooperation and communication between authorities in certain cases (Federal Office
for Migration and Refugees 2021).
Research to date has addressed the governance of
blockchains more than the governance of decentralized
digital identity systems. It remains to be seen how the
governance of decentralized identity systems differs from
today’s centralized alternatives, and how governance can
be aligned between different systems and across national
borders. We expect many similarities but also a few key
differences when the governance of decentralized digital
identity systems is compared to the governance of blockchain-based systems. Moreover, governance frameworks
should incorporate digital identities for machines, since
verifiable credentials can be used to identify and authenticate devices that belong to an individual or a business
(Fedrecheski et al. 2020). Verifiable credentials can also be
issued to sensors that feed data to smart contracts in order
to authenticate the data and prove that the sensors were
made by a trusted manufacturer. This may help address the
‘‘oracle problem’’ that is familiar to blockchain researchers
(Swan 2015).
The consequences of different design options for
decentralized digital identity systems are yet to be properly
assessed. Such assessments should not only take into
account the perspectives of participating organizations but
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also those of regulators and users. It is yet to be determined
if the adoption incentives are sufficient for wallets that are
designed to store only identity-related information. If not,
then wallets might need to additionally store central bank
digital currencies and/or crypto-assets. Other designspecific examples include different privacy options for
verifiable credentials (Hardman 2019) as well as different
resolution methods for decentralized identifiers (in combination with their corresponding PKI options) (Reed et al.
2021). Interesting research questions emerge from the
competing design choices made by different projects. It
remains to be seen, for example, if the German Federal
Chancellery’s use of the Hyperledger Aries/Indy stack can
be reconciled with the use of Hyperledger Besu by the
European Blockchain Services Infrastructure and the
Spanish Alastria Network.
Finally, there are multiple opportunities for socio-technical research into decentralized digital identity systems
(Pinch and Bijker 1984; Sahay and Robey 1996; Bryant
2006). Socio-technical researchers can study, in particular,
the effects of legal frameworks, cultural values, and privacy debates on the adoption and use of decentralized
digital identity systems (Leidner and Kayworth 2006;
O’Hara 2018; Fry and Renieris 2020); they can examine
the different problem diagnoses that decentralized digital
identity solutions are expected to address (Williams and
Hummelbrunner 2010; Checkland and Poulter 2020); and
they can explore the crucial relations between the various
governance structures and technical designs (Zwitter et al.
2020). It is also worth examining if a proximity to SSIrelated controversies affects decentralized digital identity
projects (Ghent University 2020).

5 Conclusion and Future Outlook
Verifiable credentials and standardized digital wallets offer
a convenient, secure, and privacy-oriented alternative to
both physical means of identification and centralized digital identity platforms. Governmental support for verifiable
credentials and digital wallets is particularly strong in
Canada and Germany, yet the future outlook is difficult to
predict. To be successful, decentralized digital identity
projects need to gain more traction and establish interoperability via a common governance framework (Wagner
et al. 2020; Lundy 2019). What is required is ‘‘guidance
within a legal architecture’’ (Fry and Renieris 2020). More
specifically, verifiable credentials and blockchain-based
PKI must be recognized as compliant with identity-related
regulation, such as the European Union’s Electronic
Identification, Authentication and Trust Services Regulation (Alamillo-Domingo 2020; The Council of the European Union 2014). The legally binding ID_Alastria model
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(developed in Spain), the German government’s support of
several Hyperledger Aries/Indy-based projects, and the
European Self-Sovereign Identity Framework are significant early steps. The next major steps will perhaps follow
the European Commission’s recent announcement about
European Digital Identity wallets (European Commission
2021a).
Decentralized digital identity management can expect to
face continued resistance from incumbents. Some experts
expect ‘‘wallet wars’’ not just for payments but also for
digital identities, similar to the competition between
browsers or mobile operating systems (Reed 2020). Apple,
for example, recently announced their aim to integrate a
wallet app that can store a digital driver’s license in the
next version of their mobile operating system, iOS 15
(Business Insider 2021).
Research can play an important role in the prospective
shift towards decentralized digital identities. Research is
required to investigate the actual impact of decentralized
digital identities on enterprises, individuals, and societies;
it can help design suitable solutions; and it can determine if
the adoption incentives for recent, decentralized digital
identity solutions are superior to those of past, attributebased PKI solutions.
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European Commission (2020) European blockchain service infrastructure, explained. https://ec.europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/down
load/attachments/326108260/Final.%2820201204%29%
28EBSI_European_Blockchain_Convention_Master_Class%
29%28v1.01%29.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=
1608291889774&api=v2, Accessed 25 May 2021
European Commission (2021a) Commission proposes a trusted and
secure digital identity for all Europeans. https://ec.europa.eu/
commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_2663, Accessed 25
May 2021
European Commission (2021b) COVID-19: Digital green certificates.
https://ec.europa.eu/info/live-work-travel-eu/coronavirusresponse/safe-covid-19-vaccines-europeans/covid-19-digitalgreen-certificates_en, Accessed 25 May 2021
Federal German Government (2021) New pilot project launched.
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/digital-identities1916352, Accessed 25 May 2021
Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (2021) Digitization of
certification processes in the asylum procedure by means of
digital identities. https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/
EN/Digitalisierung/blockchain-whitepaper-2021.html?nn=
282388, Accessed 25 May 2021
Fedrecheski G, Rabaey JM, Costa LCP, Calcina Ccori PC, Pereira
WT, Zuffo MK (2020) Self-sovereign identity for IoT environments: a perspective. In: Global internet of things summit, IEEE
Foucault M (1978) Part five: right of death and power over life, the
history of sexuality, vol 1. Pantheon, New York, pp 133–159
Fridgen G, Guggenmos F, Lockl J, Rieger A (2018) Challenges and
opportunities of blockchain-based platformization of digital
identities in the public sector. In: 26th European conference on
information systems
Fry E, Renieris E (2020) SSI? what we really need is full data
portability.
https://womeninidentity.org/2020/03/31/data-port
ability/, Accessed 25 May 2021
Ganesh M (2018) Data and discrimination: Fintech, biometrics and
identity in India. https://thesocietypages.org/cyborgology/2018/
01/25/fintech-aadhaar-and-identity-in-india, Accessed 25 May
2021
Gasteiger D (2021) Building a digital society that inspires! Procivis
AG (unpublished PDF file)
Ghent University (2020) EBSI social assessment report. https://ec.
europa.eu/cefdigital/wiki/download/attachments/262505908/
EBSI_Social_assessment_report.pdf?api=v2, Accessed 25 May
2021
Giannopoulou A, Wang F (2021) Self-sovereign identity. Internet
Polic Rev 10(2)
Graglia M, Mellon C, Robustelli T (2018) The nail finds a hammer:
self-sovereign identity, design principles, and property rights in
the developing world. https://www.newamerica.org/future-prop
erty-rights/reports/nail-finds-hammer, Accessed 25 May 2021
Haas R (2016) Ryan bundy declares himself an ‘idiot‘ not subject to
US
courts.
https://www.opb.org/news/series/burns-oregon-

611

standoff-bundy-militia-news-updates/ryan-bundy-incompetentsubject-federal-law/, Accessed 25 May 2021
Halpin H (2020) Vision: a critique of immunity passports and W3C
decentralized identifiers. In: van der Merwe T, Mitchell C,
Mehrnezhad M (eds) Security standardisation research: 6th
international conference. Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
Springer, Heidelberg, pp 148–168
Hardman D (2019) Categorizing verifiable credentials. https://www.
evernym.com/blog/categorizing-verifiable-credentials/, Accessed 25 May 2021
Herley C (2009) So long, and no thanks for the externalities: the
rational rejection of security advice by users. In: Proceedings of
the 2009 workshop on new security paradigms, pp. 133–144
Ishmaev G (2020) Sovereignty, privacy, and ethics in blockchainbased identity management systems. Ethics and Information
Technology
Jain S (2015) Man arrested for getting Aadhaar card for dog. https://
www.hindustantimes.com/india/man-arrested-for-getting-aad
haar-card-for-dog/story-MVtobqWtsrLXm01OkCBSvK.html,
Accessed 25 May 2021
Jordan J (2018) Digital trust: How the OrgBook enables the digital
economy.
https://bc-von.s3.amazonaws.com/2018-06-VONWebinar-for-Sovrin-Indy-Community.mp4, Accessed 25 May
2021
Khera R (ed) (2018) Dissent on Aadhaar: Big data meets big brother.
Orient BlackSwan, Hyderabad
Klarl H, Wolff C, Emig C (2009) Identity management in business
process modelling: a model-driven approach. https://epub.uniregensburg.de/8847/1/klarl2009_Identity_Management_in_Busi
ness_Process_Modelling.pdf, Accessed 25 May 2021
Kubach M, Schunck CH, Sellung R, Roßnagel H (2020) Selfsovereign and decentralized identity as the future of identity
management? In: Open identity summit 2020, Gesellschaft für
Informatik eV
Kuperberg M (2020) Blockchain-based identity management: a
survey from the enterprise and ecosystem perspective. IEEE
Transact Eng Manag 67(4):1008–1027
Leidner D, Kayworth T (2006) A review of culture in information
systems research: toward a theory of information technology
culture conflict. MIS Q 30:357–399
Linux Foundation (2020) Cross-industry coalition advances digital
trust standards. https://www.linuxfoundation.org/press-release/
2020/05/cross-industry-coalition-advances-digital-trust-stan
dards, Accessed 25 May 2021
Lioy A, Marian M, Moltchanova N, Pala M (2006) PKI past, present
and future. Int J Inf Secur 5(1):18–29
Lundy L (2019) No such thing as decentralised governance. https://
outlierventures.io/research/the-crypto-trias-politica/, Accessed
25 May 2021
Lyons T, Courcelas L, Timsit K (2019) Blockchain and digital
identity. https://www.eublockchainforum.eu/sites/default/files/
report_identity_v0.9.4.pdf, Accessed 25 May 2021
MacNab JJ (2012) What is a sovereign citizen? https://www.forbes.
com/sites/jjmacnab/2012/02/13/what-is-a-sovereign-citizen/
#dca32716012e, Accessed 25 May 2021
Maler E, Reed D (2008) The venn of identity: options and issues in
federated identity management. IEEE Secur Priv 6(2):16–23
McKinnon JD (2018) FTC probing facebook over data use by
Cambridge Analytica. https://www.wsj.com/articles/ftc-probingfacebook-over-data-use-by-cambridge-analytica-1521561803,
Accessed 25 May 2021
Mendling J, Pentland BT, Recker J (2020) Building a complementary
agenda for business process management and digital innovation.
Europ J Inf Syst 29(3):208–219
Meyer R (2018) The Cambridge Analytica scandal, in three
paragraphs.
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/

123

612

J. Sedlmeir et al.: Digital Identities and Verifiable Credentials, Bus Inf Syst Eng 63(5):603–613 (2021)

2018/03/the-cambridge-analytica-scandal-in-three-paragraphs/
556046
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